more from Cheryl Misak

Single Idea 19109

[catalogued under 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism]

Full Idea

If indefeasibility turns out to be something we can't sensibly aim at in a kind of inquiry, then the judgements that arise from that kind of 'inquiry' are not truth-apt. It is here that the realism/anti-realism debate resides.

Gist of Idea

The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry


Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 4)

Book Reference

'New Pragmatists', ed/tr. Misak,Cheryl [OUP 2009], p.87

A Reaction

A very interesting way of presenting the issue, one that makes the debate sound (to me) considerably more interesting than hitherto. I may start using the word 'indefeasible' rather a lot, in my chats with the anti-realist philosophical multitude.