more from Ross P. Cameron

Single Idea 18929

[catalogued under 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths]

Full Idea

Whilst not logically inconsistent, it would be bad if it could now be true that ten years ago there was a sea battle, but that five years ago it wasn't true that five years before that there was a sea battle.

Gist of Idea

We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist!


Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 4)

Book Reference

'Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Vol.6', ed/tr. Zimmerman,D/Bennett,K [OUP 2011], p.76

A Reaction

Nicely makes the point that you can't let the past rely on truthmakers in the present, if those truthmakers are about to go out of existence. So you need a sustained truthmaker, without giving up presentism. Enter 'temporally distributed properties'?

Related Idea

Idea 18926 One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron]