more from Ross P. Cameron

Single Idea 18928

[catalogued under 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism]

Full Idea

I think truthmaker theory is contingently true. [n24] If there could have been nothing, what makes that true? But if truthmaker maximalism is a necessary truth, there's necessarily something.

Gist of Idea

If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have


Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 4 n24)

Book Reference

'Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Vol.6', ed/tr. Zimmerman,D/Bennett,K [OUP 2011], p.75

A Reaction

Truthmaking is beginning to feel like Gödel's Theorems. You can 'make' lots and lots of truths ('prove' in Gödel), but there will be truths that elude the making. Truthmaker theory itself will be one example. So is Maximalism another one?

Related Idea

Idea 18931 Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron]