more from Ross P. Cameron

Single Idea 18878

[catalogued under 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism]

Full Idea

All that is necessary for realism, I claim, is that truth is grounded in mind-independent features of fundamental reality. Truthmaker theory comes into play because it is a theory about what those features are (ůso it isn't a commitment to realism).

Gist of Idea

Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features


Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism')

Book Reference

'Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [CUP 2008], p.122

A Reaction

[He cites Michael Devitt for this approach] What is the word 'fundamental' doing here? Because the mind-dependent parts of reality are considered non-fundamental? The no-true-Scotsman-hates-whisky move? His truthmaking is committed to 'things'.

Related Ideas

Idea 18875 Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron]

Idea 18467 Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong]

Idea 18881 For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron]