more from Ross P. Cameron

Single Idea 18877

[catalogued under 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation]

Full Idea

Moral realism isn't realism about things, and it seems strange to suggest that moral realism is existence entailing in the way that realism about unobservable is.

Gist of Idea

Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things


Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism')

Book Reference

'Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [CUP 2008], p.121

A Reaction

Cameron is questioning whether a realist has to believe in truthmakers. It seems to me that his doubts are because he insists that truthmaking is committed to the existence of 'things'. I assume any moral realism must supervene on nature.

Related Idea

Idea 17282 Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K]