more from Ross P. Cameron

Single Idea 18872

[catalogued under 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds]

Full Idea

I think we should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds.

Gist of Idea

We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds


Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec')

Book Reference

'Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [CUP 2008], p.110

A Reaction

An interesting passing remark. Presumably there would be unknowable truths about such worlds, which wouldn't bother a full-blooded realist. Indiscernible to whom? Me? Humanity? A divine mind?