more from Ross P. Cameron

Single Idea 18871

[catalogued under 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence]

Full Idea

I tend to think that the fundamental reason we can have the correspondence theory of truth is that truthmaker theory is correct.

Gist of Idea

I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers


Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec')

Book Reference

'Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [CUP 2008], p.108

A Reaction

[This responds to Fumerton 2006, who gives the opposite view] Cameron gives himself the classic problem of spelling out the correspondence relation (perhaps as 'congruence'). I like truthmaking, but I'm unsure about correspondence.