more from Ross P. Cameron

Single Idea 18868

[catalogued under 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism]

Full Idea

What possible reason could one have for thinking of some propositions that they need to be grounded in what there is that doesn't apply to all propositions?

Gist of Idea

Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are?


Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec')

Book Reference

'Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [CUP 2008], p.107

A Reaction

Well, if truthmaking said that all truths are grounded, then some could be grounded in what there is, and others in how it is, or maybe even how it isn't (if you get a decent account of negative truths).