more from Fraser MacBride

Single Idea 18466

[catalogued under 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation]

Full Idea

If a truthmaker entails its truth, this threatens to over-generate truth-makers for necessary truths - at least if the entailment is classical. It's a feature of this notion that anything whatsoever entails a given necessary truth.

Gist of Idea

If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth


Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 1.1)

Book Reference

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [], p.3

A Reaction

This is a good reason to think that the truth-making relation does not consist of logical entailment.

Related Idea

Idea 18467 Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong]