more from Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra

Single Idea 18435

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism]

Full Idea

Resemblance Nominalists cannot explain the resemblance between particulars in terms of their properties, because they explain particulars' properties in terms of their resemblances.

Gist of Idea

Resemblance Nominalists say that resemblance explains properties (not the other way round)


Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's Regress [2001], p.397), quoted by Douglas Edwards - Properties 5.5.1

Book Reference

Edwards,Douglas: 'Properties' [Polity 2014], p.105

A Reaction

While resemblance does seem to be a primitive fact of experience, and it points us towards the properties, to say that resemblance explains properties is obviously (as so often...) getting things the wrong way round. Properties ARE resemblances??