more from Carrie Jenkins

Single Idea 17731

[catalogued under 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification]

Full Idea

I find an updated verificationism plausible, in which we say something meaningful just in case we employ only concepts whose possession could be justified or disjustified by sensory input.

Gist of Idea

Verificationism is better if it says meaningfulness needs concepts grounded in the senses


Carrie Jenkins (Grounding Concepts [2008], 5.6)

Book Reference

Jenkins,Carrie: 'Grounding Concepts' [OUP 2008], p.175

A Reaction

Wow! This is the first time I have ever had the slightest sympathy for verificationism. It saves my favourite problem case - of wild but meaningful speculation, for example about the contents of another universe. A very nice idea.