more from Kathrin Koslicki

Single Idea 17315

[catalogued under 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition]

Full Idea

To make room for a less propositional conception of essence than that assumed by Fine, I urge that we distinguish more firmly between essences and real definitions (which state these essences in the form of propositions).

Gist of Idea

We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions


Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.6)

Book Reference

'Metaphysical Grounding', ed/tr. Correia,F/Schnieder,B [CUP 2012], p.212

A Reaction

Yes. The idea that essence is just a verbal or conceptual entity would be utterly abhorrent to Aristotle (a hero for Fine), and it is anathema to me too. We intend essences to be in the world (even if we are deceived about that). They explain!

Related Idea

Idea 17309 For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki]