more from Kathrin Koslicki

Single Idea 17309

[catalogued under 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition]

Full Idea

Fine assumes that essences can be identified with collections of propositions that are true in virtue of the identity of a particular object, or objects. ...There is not, on this approach, much of a distinction between essences and real definitions.

Gist of Idea

For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions


Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.4)

Book Reference

'Metaphysical Grounding', ed/tr. Correia,F/Schnieder,B [CUP 2012], p.196

A Reaction

This won't do, because the essence of a physical object is not a set of propositions, it is some aspects of the object itself, which are described in a definition. Koslicki notes that psuché is an essence, and the soul is hardly a set of propositions!

Related Idea

Idea 17315 We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki]