more from Ross P. Cameron

Single Idea 15395

[catalogued under 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism]

Full Idea

We could abandon the view that truthmakers necessitate the truth of that which makes them true, and say that an object makes a truth when its intrinsic nature suffices for that truth. The object would have a different intrinsic nature if the truth failed.

Gist of Idea

Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths?


Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Truthmakers')

Book Reference

'Routledge Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin/Simons etc [Routledge 2012], p.267

A Reaction

[He cites Josh Parsons 1999, 2005 for this] This approach seems closely related to Kit Fine's proposal that necessities arise from the natures of things. It sounds to me as if an object with that intrinsic nature would necessitate that truth.

Related Idea

Idea 15394 Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron]