more from Ross P. Cameron

Single Idea 15394

[catalogued under 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths]

Full Idea

The most popular view is that an object is a truthmaker if the object couldn't exist and the truth be false. But contingent predications are also held to need truthmakers. Socrates is not necessarily snub-nosed, so a trope or state of affairs is needed.

Gist of Idea

Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths


Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Truthmakers')

Book Reference

'Routledge Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin/Simons etc [Routledge 2012], p.267

A Reaction

Cameron calls this 'some heavy ontological commitments'. If snub-nosedness is necessitated by the trope of 'being snub-nosed', what is the truthmaker for Socrates having that trope?