more from Laura Schroeter

Single Idea 14716

[catalogued under 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics]

Full Idea

It is objected to 2D semantics that it cannot explain Kripke's cases of contingent apriori truths, for there is no single proposition (construed as a set of possible worlds) that is both apriori and contingent.

Gist of Idea

2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved


Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 2.4.2)

Book Reference

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [], p.34

A Reaction

This sounds like a rather large objection to the whole 2D plan, if it implies that when we say something there is no single proposition that is being expressed.

Related Idea

Idea 13962 Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers]