more from Richard Foley

Single Idea 12802

[catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification]

Full Idea

It is rare for pragmatic considerations to influence the rationality of our beliefs in the crass, direct way that Pascal's Wager envisions. Instead, they determine the direction and shape of our investigative and deliberative projects and practices.

Gist of Idea

We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it


Richard Foley (Justified Belief as Responsible Belief [2005], p.320)

Book Reference

'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology', ed/tr. Steup,M/Sosa,E [Blackwell 2005], p.320

A Reaction

[See Idea 6684 for Pascal's Wager] Foley is evidently a full-blown pragmatist (which is bad), but this is nicely put. We can't deny the importance of the amount of effort put into an enquiry. Maybe it is an epistemic duty, rather than a means to an end.

Related Ideas

Idea 6684 If you win the wager on God's existence you win everything, if you lose you lose nothing [Pascal]

Idea 7455 Pascal knows you can't force belief, but you can make it much more probable [Pascal, by Hacking]