more from E Margolis/S Laurence

Single Idea 11124

[catalogued under 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations]

Full Idea

A standard criticism is that the mental representation view of concepts creates just another item whose significance bears explaining. Either we have a vicious regress, or we might as well explain external language directly.

Gist of Idea

Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations


E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1.2)

Book Reference

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [], p.4

A Reaction

[They cite Dummett, with Wittgenstein in the background] I don't agree, because I think that explanation of concepts only stops when it dovetails into biology.