more from E Margolis/S Laurence

Single Idea 11122

[catalogued under 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations]

Full Idea

It may be possible to have propositional attitudes without having the mental representations tokened in one's head. ...We may say a chess-playing computer thinks it should develop its queen early, though we know it has no representation with that content.

Gist of Idea

A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations


E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1.1)

Book Reference

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [], p.3

A Reaction

[Thye cite Dennett - who talks of the 'intentional stance'] It is, of course, a moot point whether we would attribute a propositional attitude (such as belief) to a machine once we knew that it wasn't representing the relevant concepts.