more from JP Burgess / G Rosen

Single Idea 9932

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes]

Full Idea

Recent commentators have de-emphasised the set paradoxes because they play no prominent part in motivating the most articulate and active opponents of set theory, such as Kronecker (constructivism) or Brouwer (intuitionism), or Weyl (predicativism).

Gist of Idea

The paradoxes no longer seem crucial in critiques of set theory


JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], III.C.1.b)

Book Reference

Burgess,J/Rosen,G: 'A Subject with No Object' [OUP 1997], p.223

A Reaction

This seems to be a sad illustration of the way most analytical philosophers have to limp along behind the logicians and mathematicians, arguing furiously about problems that have largely been abandoned.