more from JP Burgess / G Rosen

Single Idea 9924

[catalogued under 4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic]

Full Idea

If you want a logic of metaphysical possibility, the existing literature was originally developed to supply a logic of metalogical possibility, and still reflects its origins.

Gist of Idea

Modal logic gives an account of metalogical possibility, not metaphysical possibility


JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], II.B.3.b)

Book Reference

Burgess,J/Rosen,G: 'A Subject with No Object' [OUP 1997], p.141

A Reaction

This is a warning shot (which I don't fully understand) to people like me, who were beginning to think they could fill their ontology with possibilia, which could then be incorporated into the wider account of logical thinking. Ah well...