more from David Papineau

Single Idea 7890

[catalogued under 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness]

Full Idea

The thesis of 'representational theories of consciousness' is that a creature is conscious just in case it is in a certain kind of representational state, some state which represents in a certain way.

Gist of Idea

Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way


David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002])

Book Reference

Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.221

A Reaction

[He cites Harman, Dretske and Tye] The immediate impediment I see to this view is the extreme difficulty of explaining what the special 'way' is that turns representations into consciousness. Some mental states are not representational, and vice versa.