more from David Papineau

Single Idea 7887

[catalogued under 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought]

Full Idea

The 'dispositional' HOT thesis says that a state is conscious just in case it could have been the subject of an introspective Higher-Order judgement, even if it wasn't actually so subject.


HOT stands for higher-order thought

Gist of Idea

States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements


David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.13)

Book Reference

Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.210

A Reaction

[He cites Dennett and Carruthers for this view] This is designed to meet other problems, but it sounds odd. Does it really make no difference whether higher-judgement actually occurs? How can conscious events be distinguished once they've gone?