more from David Papineau

Single Idea 7881

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism]

Full Idea

We should be ontological monists, but we should be conceptual dualists. We need to recognise a special phenomenal way of thinking about conscious properties, if we are to dispel the confusions that persuade us that conscious properties cannot be material.

Gist of Idea

Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought


David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.01)

Book Reference

Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.175

A Reaction

This idea came to me as a revelation, and strikes me as spot on. We have developed conceptual dualism simply because humans cannot directly see that their thinking is actually physical brain activity. Thought seems ungrounded, and utterly different.