more from David Papineau

Single Idea 7879

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind]

Full Idea

Mind-brain reductions are less explanatory than characteristic reductions in other areas of science, ...because phenomenal concepts have no special associations with causal roles.

Gist of Idea

Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles


David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 5.3)

Book Reference

Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.147

A Reaction

This may always have some truth in it, but I would expect reductive accounts in the far future to get much closer to giving explanations of phenomenal experience. We can't work down from the phenomenal end, but we can work up from the physical/causal end.