more from G.E.M. Anscombe

Single Idea 7439

[catalogued under 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality]

Full Idea

Anscombe argued that the qualities involved in sensations are one and all intentional only (and I think this holds even for the bodily sensations).

Gist of Idea

The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional


report of G.E.M. Anscombe (The Intentionality of Sensation [1965]) by David M. Armstrong - Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' p.xxii

Book Reference

Armstrong,D.M.: 'A Materialist Theory of Mind' [Routledge 1993], p.-2

A Reaction

Compare Harry Gildersleve's exactly opposite proposal in Idea 7272. I think I am coming round to the Anscombe view, which builds the more mysterious up from the less mysterious. Gildersleve must explain how atomic qualia arise.

Related Idea

Idea 7272 Maybe lots of qualia lead to intentionality, rather than intentionality being basic [Gildersleve]