more from Jonathan Dancy

Single Idea 7265

[catalogued under 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism]

Full Idea

I intend to suggest that moral facts are best thought of not as facts perceived but as reasons recognised in the exercise of practical moral judgement.

Gist of Idea

Moral facts are not perceived facts, but perceived reasons for judgements


Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991])

Book Reference

'A Companion to Ethics', ed/tr. Singer,Peter [Blackwell 1993], p.418

A Reaction

I'm not convinced by this modified version. Why should the fact that someone is in pain be, in itself, a reason to prevent it? There are different cultural traditions for response to the pain of others. We are the squeamish tradition.