more from William Lycan

Single Idea 6537

[catalogued under 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories]

Full Idea

The teleological view begins to explain intentionality, and in particular allows brain states and events to have false intentional content; causal and nomological theories of intentionality tend to falter on this last task.


'Nomological' views concern rule-following

Gist of Idea

Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories


William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.4)

Book Reference

Lycan,William G.: 'Consciousness' [MIT 1995], p.45

A Reaction

Certainly if you say thought is 'caused' by the world, false thought become puzzling. I'm not sure I understand the rest of this, but it is an intriguing remark about a significant issue…