more from A.C. Grayling

Single Idea 6414

[catalogued under 12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence]

Full Idea

Two propositions might contradict each other despite appearing self-evident when considered separately.

Gist of Idea

Two propositions might seem self-evident, but contradict one another


A.C. Grayling (Russell [1996], Ch.2)

Book Reference

Grayling,A.C.: 'Russell' [OUP 1996], p.42

A Reaction

Russell's proposal (Idea 5416) is important here, that self-evidence comes in degrees. If self-evidence was all-or-nothing, Grayling's point would be a major problem, but it isn't. Bonjour explores the idea more fully (e.g. Idea 3704)

Related Ideas

Idea 3704 Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour]

Idea 5416 If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct [Russell]