more from Brian Ellis

Single Idea 5481

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties]

Full Idea

One cannot think of a property as just a set of objects in a domain (as Fregean logicians do), as though the property has no powers, but is just a way of classifying objects.

Gist of Idea

Properties have powers; they aren't just ways for logicians to classify objects


Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7)

Book Reference

Ellis,Brian: 'The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism' [Acumen 2002], p.126

A Reaction

I agree. It is sometimes suggested that properties are what 'individuate' objects, but how could they do that if they didn't have some power? If properties are known by their causal role, why do they have that causal role?