more from David M. Armstrong

Single Idea 4433

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism]

Full Idea

The standard objections to Predicate and Concept Nominalism are that some properties have no predicates or concepts, and that predicates and concepts seem to be types rather than particulars, and it is types the theory is seeking to analyse.

Gist of Idea

Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive


David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503)

Book Reference

'A Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Kim,Jaegwon/Sosa,Ernest [Blackwell 1995], p.503

A Reaction

The claim that some properties have no concepts is devastating if true, but may not be. The regress problem is likely to occur in any explanation of universals, I suspect.