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Single Idea 4033

[catalogued under 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects]

Full Idea

The Identity of Indiscernibles is not a necessary truth. It fails in possible worlds where there are two identical spheres in a non-absolute space, or worlds without beginning or end where events are exactly cyclically repeated.


The principle (associated with Leibniz) claims that if two things can't be distinguished they are the same

Gist of Idea

Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible


Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], 5)

Book Reference

'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.132

A Reaction

The principle was always very suspect, and these seem nice counterexamples. As so often, epistemology and ontology had become muddled.