more from David M. Armstrong

Single Idea 4031

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism]

Full Idea

I suggest that we reject the notion that just because the predicate 'red' applies to an open class of particulars, therefore there must be a property, redness.

Clarification

Predicates are part of language, properties part of reality

Gist of Idea

It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property

Source

David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978], p.8), quoted by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' 6

Book Reference

'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.13


A Reaction

At last someone sensible (an Australian) rebuts that absurd idea that our ontology is entirely a feature of our language