more from David Papineau

Single Idea 3515

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind]

Full Idea

Physicalism does not deny that there are conscious experiences, nor that 'it is like something to have them'. The claim is only that this is nothing different from what it is to be a physical system of the relevant kind.

Gist of Idea

Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing


David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], 4.2)

Book Reference

Papineau,David: 'Philosophical Naturalism' [Blackwell 1993], p.106

A Reaction

The implication is that no physicalist is an extreme eliminativist about consciousness, which seems to be correct. We all concede that weather exists, but have a reductive view of it. The key question is whether mind is reducible to physics.