more from David Papineau

Single Idea 3512

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability]

Full Idea

If functionalism implies that there is nothing physically in common among the realisations of a given mental state, then there is no possibility of any uniform explanation of why they all give rise to a common physical result.

Gist of Idea

If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour?


David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], 2.2)

Book Reference

Papineau,David: 'Philosophical Naturalism' [Blackwell 1993], p.35

A Reaction

This is the well known interaction problem for dualism. The standard reply is to accept interaction as a given (with no apparent explanation). A miracle, if you like.