more from David Papineau

Single Idea 3510

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind]

Full Idea

Supervenience is a necessary condition for physicalism, but it is not sufficient. Epiphenomenalism rules out mental variation without physical variation, but says mental properties are quite distinct from physical properties.

Gist of Idea

Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism


David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], 1.2)

Book Reference

Papineau,David: 'Philosophical Naturalism' [Blackwell 1993], p.11

A Reaction

I take full epiphenomenalism about mind to be incoherent, and not worth even mentioning (see Idea 7379). Papineau seems to be thinking of so-called property dualism (which may also be incoherent!).

Related Idea

Idea 7379 If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett]