more from Jaegwon Kim

Single Idea 3413

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind]

Full Idea

The main argument for the physical supervenience of qualia, then, is the apparent conceivability of zombies and qualia inversion in organisms physically indistinguishable from us.

Gist of Idea

Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience


Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.171)

Book Reference

Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.171

A Reaction

Since neither zombies nor qualia inversion for identical brains seem to me to be even remotely conceivable, I won't trouble myself with the very vague concept of 'supervenience'.