more from Jaegwon Kim

Single Idea 3362

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind]

Full Idea

If one accepts the supervenience of mental on physical, this logically implies that there can only be one Cartesian soul, because such souls are physically indiscernible, and hence mentally indiscernible.

Gist of Idea

Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible


Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 10)

Book Reference

Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.10

A Reaction

Not very persuasive. Brains are certainly discernible, and so are parts of brains. Egos might be mentally discernible. I don't find my notion of personal identity collapsing just because I espouse property dualism.