more from Georges Rey

Single Idea 3204

[catalogued under 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use]

Full Idea

The view that the meaning of language of thought expressions is based on their conceptual role (derived from Wittgenstein's idea of meaning as use), is most plausible for the logical connectives like "and", but implausible for, say, "animal".

Gist of Idea

The meaning of "and" may be its use, but not of "animal"


Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 9.1.2)

Book Reference

Rey,Georges: 'Contemporary Philosophy of Mind' [Blackwell 1997], p.239

A Reaction

It was the logical connectives that got LW started on this track. If it doesn't work for 'animal' then does that mean we need two different theories?