more from Georges Rey

Single Idea 3142

[catalogued under 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia]

Full Idea

If we allow as a brute fact that certain mental states possess conscious qualitative content, there is still the problem of explaining why they possess one content rather than another (why does this stimulus look RED?).

Gist of Idea

Why qualia, and why this particular quale?


Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 2.1)

Book Reference

Rey,Georges: 'Contemporary Philosophy of Mind' [Blackwell 1997], p.43

A Reaction

This strikes me as the Really Hard Question. The Hard Question is merely 'why are creatures aware of their thoughts?' Personally I don't rule out finding a physical answer to the RHQ, and it is certainly not grounds for drifting into neo-dualism.