more from Gilbert Harman

Single Idea 3096

[catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism]

Full Idea

Scepticism is undermined once it is seen that the relevant kind of justification is not a matter of derivation from basic principles but is rather a matter of showing that a view fits in well with other things we believe.

Gist of Idea

Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations


Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 10.4)

Book Reference

Harman,Gilbert: 'Thought' [Princeton 1977], p.164

A Reaction

I would (now) call myself a 'coherentist' about justification, and I agree with this. Coherent justification could not possibly deliver certainty, so it must be combined with fallibilism.