more from William Lyons

Single Idea 2978

[catalogued under 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories]

Full Idea

In contrast with Brentano and Husserl, consciousness or attention are no longer seen as essential to intentionality.

Gist of Idea

Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality


William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], Intro)

Book Reference

Lyons,William: 'Approaches to Intentionality' [OUP 1998], p.4

A Reaction

This strikes me as being correct, although there seem to be plenty of current philosophers who do not accept it (e.g. Searle). I think philosophy of mind may be stuck in the dark ages if thinkers don't accept this proposal.

Related Idea

Idea 3481 Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle]