more from Jaegwon Kim

Single Idea 2327

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument]

Full Idea

My doubts about functionalist accounts of qualia are based on the much discussed arguments from qualia inversions, and from epistemic considerations.


'Inversions' are seeing marigold where others see violet; 'epistemic' means to do with knowledge

Gist of Idea

Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful


Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], 4 p.102)

Book Reference

Kim,Jaegwon: 'Mind in the Physical World' [MIT 2000], p.102

A Reaction

With a colour inversion experience changes but function doesn't. But maybe function does change if you ask the right questions. 'Is this a warm colour?' It certainly strikes me that qualia contain useful (epistemic) information.