more from Jaegwon Kim

Single Idea 2324

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism]

Full Idea

There has been much scepticism about a functionalist account of intentionality, particularly from Putnam (recently) and Searle, but, like many others, I don't see any principled objections to such an account.

Gist of Idea

Intentionality as function seems possible

Source

Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], 4 p.101)

Book Reference

Kim,Jaegwon: 'Mind in the Physical World' [MIT 2000], p.101


A Reaction

I agree. I don't believe that intentionality is a candidate for being one of those many 'magic' qualities which are supposed to make the reduction of mind to brain impossible.