more from Simon Critchley

Single Idea 20447

[catalogued under 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory]

Full Idea

The issue is not so much justification as motivation, that in virtue of which the self can be motivated to act on some conception of the good. ...How does a self bind itself to whatever it determines as its good?

Gist of Idea

The problems is not justifying ethics, but motivating it. Why should a self seek its good?


Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 2)

Book Reference

Critchley,Simon: 'Impossible Objects: interviews' [Politty 2012], p.41

A Reaction

That is a bold and interesting idea about the starting point for ethics. It is always a problem for Aristotle, that he can offer no motivation for the quest for virtue. Contractarians start from existing motivations, but that isn't impressive.