more from Georges Rey

Single Idea 20303

[catalogued under 19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions]

Full Idea

The movement of 'experimental philosophy' has pointed to evidence of considerable malleability of subject's 'intuitions' with regard to the standard kinds of thought experiments on which defenses of analytic claims typically rely.

Gist of Idea

Research throws doubts on the claimed intuitions which support analyticity


Georges Rey (The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction [2013], 4.4)

Book Reference

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [], p.14

A Reaction

See Cappelen's interesting attack on the idea that philosophy relies on intuitions, and hence his attack on experimental philosophy. Our consensus on ordinary English usage hardly qualifies as somewhat vague 'intuitions'.