more from Georges Rey

Single Idea 20299

[catalogued under 19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique]

Full Idea

How in the end are we going to distinguish claims or the analytic as 'rational insight', 'primitive compulsion', inferential practice or folk belief from merely some deeply held empirical conviction, indeed, from mere dogma.

Gist of Idea

If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical?


Georges Rey (The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction [2013], 4.1)

Book Reference

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [], p.11

A Reaction

This is Rey's summary of the persisting Quinean challenge to analytic truths, in the face of a set of replies, summarised by the various phrases here. So do we reject a dogma of empiricism, by asserting dogmatic empiricism?