more from Robert C. Stalnaker

Single Idea 16430

[catalogued under 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics]

Full Idea

Two-dimensionalism says the necessity of a statement is constituted by the fact that the secondary intensions is a necessary proposition, and their a posteriori character is constituted by the fact that the associated primary intension is contingent.

Gist of Idea

Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension


Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 2)

Book Reference

Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.205

A Reaction

This view is found in Sidelle 1989, and then formalised by Jackson and Chalmers. I like metaphysical necessity, but I have some sympathy with the approach. The question must always be 'where does this necessity derive from'?