more from Robert C. Stalnaker

Single Idea 16409

[catalogued under 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts]

Full Idea

I defend a version of counterpart theory that is quite different from Lewis's version, as it is tied to actualism (all that exists is part of the actual world) rather than possibilism (possible things may exist without actually existing).

Gist of Idea

Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory


Robert C. Stalnaker (Counterparts and Identity [1987], 1)

Book Reference

Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.112

A Reaction

This could be the theory I am after. I am sympathetic to both actualism and to counterpart theory. Off to the woodshed….