more from Robert C. Stalnaker

Single Idea 16399

[catalogued under 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds]

Full Idea

I argue for the metaphysical neutrality of the possible worlds framework, but I do not suggest that its use is free of ontological commitment to possibilities (ways things might be, counterfactual situations, possible states of worlds).

Gist of Idea

Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains


Robert C. Stalnaker (Reference and Necessity [1997], 2)

Book Reference

Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.171

A Reaction

Glad to hear this, as I have always been puzzled at possible aspirations to eliminate modality (such as possibility) by introducing 'possible' worlds. Commitment to possibilities I take to be basic and unavoidable.